Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy and corruption. Dodging the "Grabbing Hand" in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates.
I. Introduction
What drives entrepreneurs and large businesses underground? One school of thought identifies high tax rates as the main culprit. In other words, companies that operate in the unofficial economy are simply trying to keep all of their profits for themselves. An alternative view holds that when unregistered economic activity rises, the political and social institutions that govern the economy are to blame. According to this theory, bureaucracy, corruption, and a weak legal system bear primary responsibility for driving businesses underground. Firm managers may be willing to be taxed at a reasonable rate, but they are unwilling to put up with constant extortionate and arbitrary demands.
A Western manager who decided against locating a plant in Russia illustrates the logic behind the second view. He explains: "It doesn't matter who it is: fire inspector, zoning committee member, mayor for that region, anybody can come and shut you down in five minutes. The fire guy could come, find fire hazards, and demand $50,000 into his overseas account. They know that if you shut down production for a few days, you're going to lose a lot more" (Wilson 1996) . Faced with this hostile environment, foreign firms may choose to locate elsewhere. However, for local entrepreneurs seeking to avoid the same risks, the usual course is to go underground (Kaufmann 1997) . This paper evaluates these two theories using 1990s data for tax rates, bureaucracy, corruption, the legal environment, and the size of the unofficial economy in 69 countries.
1 Our analysis reveals no evidence that higher direct or indirect tax rates are associated with a larger unofficial economy. In fact, we find some evidence that higher direct tax rates are associated with a smaller underground sector. However, when we control for per capita income, in order to allow for the possibility that richer countries have better-run administrations and higher tax rates, the relationship ceases to be significant. By contrast, more bureaucracy, greater corruption, and a weaker legal environment are all associated with a larger unofficial economy, even (in most cases) when we control for per capita income.
This result suggests that poor institutions and a large unofficial economy go hand in hand. It does not, however, resolve the question of which comes first: do poor institutions cause high levels of underground activity, or do high levels of underground activity undermine basic institutions? To address this issue, we use a set of exogenous instrumental variables, developed
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV 1999) , that measure long-standing linguistic fractionalization, the origins of the legal system, the religious composition of the population, and geographic location (latitude). LLSV (1999) show that these variables are significantly correlated with institutional development across a wide range of countries. The instrumental variable results in our regressions show there is an exogenous component of "institutions" that is significantly correlated with the size of the unofficial economy. This suggests a causal link running from weak economic institutions to a large unofficial economy.
A simple story can explain this result: when faced with onerous bureaucracy, high levels of corruption, and a weak legal system, businesses hide their activities "underground."
2 Consequently, tax revenues fall, and the quality of public administration declines accordingly, further reducing a firm's incentives to remain "official." Supporting evidence for this story is found in the fact that poor institutions are also associated with lower tax revenue as a share of GDP.
This paper builds on earlier work, in which we focus on establishing a link between are taxed at rate t. There is also a deadweight over-regulation or bureaucracy cost, at rate r per unit of output.
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If the entrepreneur diverts resources underground, he cannot use them in his main production process but instead in another lower productivity activity. Let D be the amount of resources diverted. To simplify the model we assume that this process directly generates value D for the entrepreneur. 7 Furthermore, there is a cost of operating underground because the entrepreneur may be caught and punished. This cost is denoted kD 2 /2, where k is a parameter that measures the effectiveness of the legal system. The idea behind this functional form is that it is easy to divert a small amount of resources but the marginal value of diversion falls as the level of diversion increases. 8 For example, the diversion may become easier to observe for the government or courts.
Note that productivity in the official sector, R(T), depends on the level of tax revenues.
This assumption is designed to capture the important point that if tax revenues are used wisely they can raise productivity through improved education or better roads or stronger law and order.
In our model, the government has two positive functions: it provides productivity-enhancing public goods, represented by R(T), and it maintains a legal system that penalizes firms for diverting resources underground, represented by k. If the legal system is stronger, k is higher and there is a higher expected penalty for operating underground.
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Assuming that R depends on T is slightly more general, because it allows for the government to produce productivity-enhancing public goods other than law and order, e.g., education and roads. 6 The over-regulation or bureaucracy cost is intended to represent costs imposed on business by bureaucrats from which the government obtains no revenue and which do not generate any positive benefits for society. Alternatively, we could refer to this term as corruption. It is quite distinct from regulations that have a positive social impact (e.g., environmental or safety rules.) 7 Strictly speaking, the entrepreneur should be able to earn a return on money invested in the unofficial activity. However, it simplifies our analysis to assume that the gross return in this activity is just equal to 1. 8 More generally, we just need to assume that the cost of diverting resources is convex. This is necessary to simplify the analysis. 9 Theoretically, k could also be high in be a dictatorship that shoots people for operating underground. Empirically this does not appear to be the case. Weaker civil liberties are strongly correlated with more unofficial activity. At
The entrepreneur maximizes utility:
The optimal amount of diversion, D*, is found by solving:
We assume that (1-r)R(T)<1, so there is always an incentive to divert a portion of the retained earnings.
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The comparative statics predictions are straightforward for the bureaucracy parameter, r.
According to this model, more bureaucracy increases the incentive to divert resources into unofficial activities and thus depresses the overall level of economic activity. In contrast, the relationship between diversion and the tax rate, t, and the quality of the legal environment, k, is more complicated. There is an important link through the effect of diversion on government revenue and on the ability of the government to provide important public services, such as legal enforcement.
Government revenue equals the product of the tax rate and production in the official sector,
We assume that tax revenue is used to produce "law and order":
Higher taxation increases the incentive to divert resources but it may, depending on the nature of least for the countries in our sample, this is because dictatorships are corrupt and this corruption affects the legal system also, so prosecutors and judges can be bribed and it is hard to enforce any rules.
the initial equilibrium, also increase the level of law and order and other productivity-enhancing public goods, which reduces the incentive to divert. 11 Bureaucracy is assumed not to generate any government revenue, so more bureaucracy (i.e., higher r) simply increases the incentive to hide economic activity.
Consider the simplest case with fixed k and R, K(T)=k and R(T)=R. We set Y=1 to simplify the notation. Then an equilibrium satisfies D* = [1-(1-t-r)R]/k and thus tax revenue is T= t R(1-D*). Now assume that a=[1-(1-(1-r)R)]R/k>0, and define b=R 2 /k. The "Laffer equation" that relates tax revenue to the tax rate is now:
which is quadratic in t. This function peaks at t=a/2b. It cuts the x axis in 2 places: T(0)=0 and T(a/b)=0. In addition, note that T(t)=0 for t>a/b.
To understand the implications of these assumptions, consider the example where r=1/5
and R(T)=9/8. 12 In this case a=(9/8)(1-9/10k), b=(81/64)k, and the maximum of T(t) is at (8k(10k-9)/80). When k equals k L =1.3, the peak is approximately at 1/8, and when k equals k H =1.75 the peak is approximately at 3/8. These two tax curves are shown superimposed in Figure 1 , with t on the x-axis and T on the y-axis. The smaller peak is to the left of the larger peak. The larger peak is everywhere above the smaller peak, i.e., most importantly, its slope is steeper for small t.
Now consider the situation if there is a threshold effect for tax revenues. In this situation, the government needs to raise revenue above a certain level before the legal system begins to function well. This may be because there are fixed costs in setting up a court system or a 10 This assumption simplifies the analysis without affecting the basic intuition.
11 For an equilibrium model based on the idea that maintaining a legal system is costly and requires revenue see Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) . In their model, countries are likely to move to extreme equilibria with either a high or low level of public goods. minimum spending level is needed before the courts can function throughout the country. We can model this with the following function: K(T)=k L for T≤.04, and K(T) = k H for T>.04. In this case, the Laffer "curve" looks like the thick lines in Figure 1 (again t is on the x-axis and T is on the y-axis). This relationship is actually a correspondence because it is multi-valued under the top peak.
The intuition behind this result is that it is always possible to be in equilibrium on the lower curve. In this case, entrepreneurs expect k to be low, so they divert more to the underground economy, which means that the government raises relatively little revenue and can only afford to provide k at a low level. However, there exists another set of equilibria in which entrepreneurs expect k to be high, so the government is able to raise more revenue and fund a higher level of k.
The model suggests an important contrast between the effects of bureaucratic overregulation and corruption on the one hand and tax rates on the other hand. More over-regulation and corruption constitute an unambiguous disincentive to produce in the official sector and should be correlated with a higher share of unofficial activity. We would expect them also to be correlated with lower government revenue as a percent of GDP and a weaker legal environment.
In contrast, higher tax rates have two potentially offsetting effects: the direct effect increases the incentive to hide activity, but the indirect effect -through the provision of a better legal environment -encourages production in the official sector. The model suggests that a higher tax rate will not necessarily be correlated with a higher share of unofficial activity.
Higher tax rates will also not necessarily be correlated with government revenue as a percent of GDP or with the strength of the legal environment.
12 Our results are changed only slightly if R(T) is not constant. Details are available from the authors. The data sources differ across regions. The primary source of data on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) . These authors use data on total electricity consumption to compare unofficial activity across countries. Electricity consumption offers a rough measure of overall economic activity; around the world, the short-run electricity-to-GDP elasticity is usually close to one.
III. The Data

Measures of the Unofficial Economy
Measured GDP by definition captures only the official part of the economy, so the difference between overall and measured GDP gives an estimate of the size of the unofficial economy.
Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) make further adjustments to allow for differences in the elasticity of demand across countries. Schneider and Enste (1998) also report alternative estimates from Lacko (1996) suggesting that the unofficial economy is a bit smaller than estimated by Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997 Our estimates of the unofficial economy share in GDP for OECD countries were obtained primarily from two sources: Friedrich Schneider (1997) and Colin C. Williams and Jan Windebank (1995) . 17 Both sources base their estimates on studies that assume the use of cash is 13 Lacko's method infers the size of the shadow economy from the household consumption of electricity. For details see Schneider and Enste (1998 ), pp.17-19. See also Lacko 91997a, 1997b , and 1999 14 As underlying causal variables, Loayza uses the highest statutory corporate income tax in the country, an index of government imposed restrictions on labor markets, and Political Risk Services' indices for the quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in government, and rule of law. The proxy variables serving as indicators of the unofficial economy itself (left hand side variables in the first stage of Loayza's procedure) are the rate of value-added tax evasion (Silvani and Grondolo 1993) and the percentage of the nonagricultural labor force which does not contribute to social security (World Bank 1995) . 15 The first step is maximum likelihood estimation applied to a reduced form in which the dependent variable is the set of proxy indicators and the explanatory variables are the underlying causes. The coefficients are identified by normalizing the coefficients that relate the latent variable with one of the indicators. In order to obtain estimates of the latent unofficial economy variable, the parameters from the first stage regression are used in a second "causes" regression (Loayza 1998). This procedure is very similar to estimating a relationship between observable proxy variables and underlying causes, and then inferring the unobservable dependent variable from its relationship to the proxy variables. 16 Table 1 shows there are important differences between the estimates for some important countries, such as Chile, Mexico, Russia, and Ukraine. The relative position of some Latin American and former Soviet countries is reversed. Nevertheless, our main results are robust to our choice of data series. 17 Williams and Windebank use data from Bruno Dallago (1990) and European Community (1990) . Schneider (1997) uses the "currency-demand approach," which assumes shadow transactions take place in the form of cash. The paper reports results from several authors, and when the data was not available for 1990 (i.e. Austria, Denmark, correlated with unofficial activities. For Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and Netherlands we used the simple average from the Schneider (1997) and Williams and Windebank (1995) . For Canada and Japan the only estimates we could find were from Bruce Bartlett (1990) . 18 For Greece and the United Kingdom, our data are the average of the estimates by Bartlett (1990) and Williams and Windebank (1995) . For Norway and Sweden we averaged estimates by Bartlett (1990) and Schneider (1997 Schneider (1997) ). Most of these estimates are for the early 1990s. Schneider and Enste (1998) report alternative estimates of currency demand, but the differences from our series are for the most part quite small (see Appendix 1 and Table 1 ).
For Africa and Asia our source is Schneider and Enste (1998). They draw primarily on
Lacko's electricity-method, but they also add currency demand-based estimates for Tanzania and Mexico. They also review carefully the available qualitative and anecdotal evidence, and find that the quantitative estimates are reasonable.
Measures of Policy
As measures of policy we use expert ratings of the business environment calculated by Here we briefly review the methodology of each source and country coverage. In most cases we are not able to get exactly 69 observations. We also explain what each index measures.
The sample size and range of each variable are discussed in more detail when we present the regression results.
The scale of 1 (poorest rating) to 7 (perfect rating). We use data from three questions. The first asks whether government regulations impose "a heavy burden on business competitiveness".
The second asks respondents to rate government regulations from "vague and lax" to "precise and fully enforced." The third asks how common are "irregular, additional payments connected with import and export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications."
We also use data on responses to the bribery question in the 1996 
Instrumental Variables
Our model implies an important simultaneity between the quality of economic institutions on the one hand and the share of the unofficial economy on the other. For example, if the model is correct, more over-regulation increases diversion of resources underground, but this diversion reduces government revenue and undermines economic institutions such as the rule of law. To deal with this issue, we use the set of instrumental variables developed by LLSV (1999).
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) have five sets of variables that can be used as instruments. LLSV (1999, Table 2 ) use these variables to explain institutional development. We use their independent variables in our first stage regression (i.e., as instruments).
First, they measure ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Second, they report the share of each country's population that is Catholic, Muslim, Protestant or other. These fractions sum to 100, and we follow LLSV (1998) in using the Protestant proportion as our base category. Third, they calculate the origin of commercial laws. There are five possible origins: English, French, Scandinavian, German, and socialist. LLSV (1998) code five dummy variables, each of which equals one if a country belongs to a particular legal system and zero otherwise. Every country belongs to at least one system. We use the English system as our base case. 21 The final instrument is the geographical location of countries, as measured by the absolute value of countries' latitudes.
IV. Results
To make our results easier to understand, in the main text we present a summary of our results and some key robustness tests. Appendix 2 presents regressions using alternative independent variables and also a more complete set of robustness checks, including instrumental variables estimation. We summarize these results in the main text but only look in detail only at one variable representing each of the four categories of independent variable: tax rates, overregulation, legal environment, and corruption. Table 2 reports OLS results for one variable representing each category of independent variable. It also shows the effects of dropping the MIMIC data from Loayza (1996) . We also show the effects of running the same regression just for three regions: Latin America, OECD, and transition countries. The Latin American data is primarily from the MIMIC method, the OECD data is primarily from currency demand estimates, and the transition countries' data is primarily from electricity data. These regional regressions are therefore also checks on the effects of using different methodologies. We unfortunately do not have enough data on Africa or 21 We use legal origin only as an instrument in this paper. We are therefore just concerned that it be exogenous with respect to the unofficial economy in the 1990s. We are not concerned here with exactly how legal origin came about Asia to run separate regressions for those regions.
Tax Rates
We have information on 8 measures of tax rates from 3 independent sources. The full set of unofficial economy regressions using this data are in Appendix Table 1 .
Here we focus on the Heritage Foundation measure of 1997 tax rates, in which a higher score (on a scale of 1-5) means more onerous taxation, i.e., higher average and marginal tax rates. 22 Note that OECD countries typically have a score that is higher than that for transition economies and for Latin America. For example, in 1997 the US scores 3.5, UK scores 4, and
Italy scores 5, while among the transition economies Georgia scores 2.5, Russia scores 3.5, and
Ukraine scores 4.5 and in Latin America, Brazil scores 2.5 and Argentina scores 3.5. In other words, according to this measure the US has higher marginal and average tax rates than does Russia. Table 2 and Appendix Table 1 show that this measure of taxation is significant in 1997 (and in 1995). However, higher tax rates are correlated with a lower share of the unofficial economy. Raising taxation by one point, according to this measure, implies that the share of the unofficial economy falls by 9.1 percent. Controlling for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient by about half in all three years but it remains significant (see Appendix Table 1 ). In the instrumental variables regression (Appendix Table 1 ), the coefficient on the taxation variable is negative and significant (except when we control for log income in 1997). Table 2 shows that dropping the MIMIC data does not change the finding that higher tax rates are correlated with a small unofficial economy -the coefficient in the regression (second or what it really represents.column of Table 2 ) falls to -7.4 but remains significant at the 5% level. However, the tax rate variable is not significant in any of the three regional regressions. This may be due to insufficient observations, but it is also possible that the tax rate result in the main regression is caused by cross-region (and cross-methodology) variation.
Summarizing the complete results in Appendix 2, higher tax rates are generally correlated with a lower share of the unofficial economy. This is true if we use tax rates directly or if we use an index representing the effective tax burden. Richer countries have both higher tax rates and a smaller unofficial economy. Across the countries in our sample, the incentive to go underground to dodge higher tax rates is outweighed by the benefits of remaining official when tax rates are higher. This is probably because, at least for this set of countries, higher tax rates generate revenue that provides productivity enhancing public goods and a strong legal environment.
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Over-Regulation
The Heritage Foundation's measure of over-regulation is higher, on a scale of 1 to 5, for countries that have regulations that are worse for business. We use this index for 1995 (in Appendix Table 2 ) and also for 1997 (in Table 2 ). In 1995, the Czech Republic and Britain have the best score -they are the only countries in our sample to get a perfect 1. Most OECD countries score 2. A number of East European and Latin American countries score 4 (out of a possible 5). Table 2 shows that a one-point increase in this index is associated with a 12.0 percent increase in 1997. Appendix Table 2 shows that controlling for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient on the over-regulation variable, to 6.2 in 1995 and to 4.7 in 1997, but in both cases it remains significant (although only at the 10% level in 1997). The over-regulation 23 The last two rows of Appendix Table 1 show the effects of introducing "law and order" (representing the level of public goods provision) into the taxation regressions. Any tax variable that is significant in the OLS regression indices for 1995 and 1997 are also significant in the instrumental variable regressions (Appendix Table 2 ).
Again Table 2 shows that dropping the MIMIC data does not change this result substantially -the coefficient falls to 10.8 and stays significant at the 5% level. The overregulation variable is also significant in all three of the regional regressions, even though we only have 15 observations for both Latin America and the transition countries.
Summarizing the results in the appendix, every available measure of over-regulation is significantly correlated with the share of the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship is unambiguous: more over-regulation is correlated with a larger unofficial economy. 24 For all but one of our variables, the coefficient in our basic instrumental variables regression is also significant. For 6 out of our 9 measures, the correlation is significant even once we control for log per capita income. Overall, this is strong evidence that, across countries, more overregulation is associated with more unofficial activity.
It is important to point out the difference between regulation and over-regulation. The measures we are using, such as that of Freedom House, explicitly focus on the "pro-business" character of the state and thus include strong rules with respect to the preservation of property rights and contract enforcement. 25 We find that more over-regulation is correlated with more unofficial activity.
This does not imply that sensible regulation, for example concerning pollution or health and safety at work, necessarily are associated with more unofficial activity. At present, we do not have sufficient data to test this point thoroughly, but the anecdotal evidence suggests that using the same sample becomes insignificant when we introduce this control for the legal environment. 24 When we drop the MIMIC data from Loayza (1996) , 8 out 9 of these measures remain significant. The exception is IMD's measure of whether the bureaucracy is a hindrance to business (see Appendix Table 2 ). 25 We are grateful to a referee for making this distinction clear to us. many such regulations can be productivity-enhancing when implemented in a sensible manner. This is a topic for further research.
Legal Environment
In the Fraser Institute measure of "Equality of Citizens under the Law and Access of
Citizens to a Non-Discriminatory Judiciary," a higher score means a "better" legal system, on a scale of 0-10. 26 We have this data for 61 countries in our sample. Only Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland get the top score of 10. Italy, UK and USA score 7.5. Russia scores 2.5 and Brazil scores 0. Table 2 shows that a one-point increase in this index (i.e., an improvement in the legal system) implies a 3.9 percentage point fall in the unofficial economy's share of total GDP. Controlling for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient to 2.4 but it remains significant at the 5% level (Appendix Table 3 ). This variable is significant in the basic instrumental variables regression, but not once we control for income.
Dropping the MIMIC data actually increases the coefficient to -4.1 (Table 2 ). The legal system variable is not significant in the Latin America or transition regressions, but it is significant in the OECD regression.
In summary, the results in the appendix show a weaker legal environment is strongly correlated with a larger share of the unofficial economy in GDP. All 5 of our legal environment measures are significant in the basic OLS and IV regressions and 3 of them remain significant when we control for log GDP per capita in both the OLS and IV cases. The results for shareholder rights are much weaker: 2 out of 3 measures are significant, although only at the 10% level, and only 1 is significant in an IV regression. Creditor rights do not appear to be significantly correlated with the unofficial economy, although it is just possible that stronger creditor rights might be associated with a larger unofficial economy.
Corruption
The Political Risk Services index for the 1990s has data on 42 countries. This index runs from 1 to 6, with a higher score still representing less corruption, and in this case the most corruption is reported to be in Paraguay, followed closely by several other Latin American countries. A one-point increase in this index is correlated with a 9.7% fall in the share of the unofficial economy. Controlling for log GDP per capita reduces the coefficient to 6.4, but it remains significant at the 5% level; the R 2 rises from 0.6 to 0.64. In this case, the variable is significant in both the IV regressions.
Dropping the MIMIC data reduces the coefficient to -5.5 but it remains significant at the 5% level (Table 2 ). This corruption variable is significant in both the Latin American (at the 10% level) and OECD (at the 5% level) regressions. It is not, however, significant for transition countries, probably because this regression only has 7 observations. In summary, the relationship between share of the unofficial economy and rule of law (including corruption) is strong and consistent across eight measures provided by six distinct organizations. Results from all eight of the indices shown in Appendix Table 4 suggest that countries with more corruption have a higher share of the unofficial economy. This is true for 5 of the indices even when we control for income level, for 8 of the indices in the basic IV regression, and for 3 of the indices in the IV regression that also controls for income.
Public Finance
According to our model, higher tax rates could be correlated with either higher or lower government revenue. However, there is an unambiguous prediction for the other three variables.
Higher government revenue as a percent of GDP should be correlated with less over-regulation, less corruption, and stronger legal institutions. Table 3 shows regressions for two measures of tax revenue: as a percent of official GDP and as a percent of total (official plus unofficial) GDP. As right-hand side variables, we use one index for each of our four categories, taxation, over-regulation, legal environment, corruption.
We also report results from using the share of the unofficial economy as a regressor. We run each regression with and without controlling for log GDP per capita.
The first four columns show that higher tax rates are actually correlated with higher tax revenues in all specifications. A one-point increase in this taxation index is associated with between 7 and 8.6 percentage point increase in revenue as a percent of GDP. In terms of our model, this suggests that across countries the indirect effect of tax rates on the unofficial economy dominates the direct effect, i.e., higher tax rates can generate revenue that improves the legal environment enough to encourage activity to stay in the official sector. We would caution, however, that this does not mean that raising tax rates in any one country would necessarily increase revenue and reduce unofficial activity.
The remaining columns show that more over-regulation, a weaker legal environment, more corruption, and a larger unofficial economy are all associated with less government revenue. The results are a little weaker when we control for log GDP per capita, and the corruption variable is not significant at all in this case, but most of the coefficients are robust.
The unofficial economy variable is significant in all four specifications, implying that a one point increase in the share of the unofficial economy means a fall in tax revenue as a percent of official GDP from 0.3 to 0.5% and as a percent of total GDP from 0.5 to 0.6%.
These results further support our view that weak institutions, but not high tax rates, undermine the government's ability to collect tax revenue. Although our evidence is crosscountry rather than time series, it strongly suggests that firms going underground leads to lower government revenue, and that this in turn reduces the quality of important institutions and thus increases the incentive to go underground.
Why is bad government also small government (LSSV 1999)? We suggest the answer lies first and foremost with the ability of firms everywhere to go underground. Going underground undermines government revenue and reduces the provision of public goods that are important for production in the official sector. In turn this reduces the incentive for entrepreneurs and managers to keep their activities in the official, taxable sector.
V. Conclusion
Higher marginal tax rates do not appear to be associated with a larger unofficial economy. Discretion in the application of rules, and the corruption that this produces, seems to have a more important effect. We find smaller unofficial sectors in countries with a lower regulatory "burden" on enterprise, less corruption, a better rule of law, and higher tax revenue.
Both over-regulation and corruption amount to a higher effective tax on official activity and therefore induce firms to move into the unofficial economy. Moving to the unofficial economy undermines public finance and further weakens the ability of the state to protect property rights (particularly from lower level officials).
This does not imply that regulation per se drives activity underground. In fact, it is quite possible that sensible regulations, for example on health and safety at work, contribute to higher productivity. Unfortunately, in much of the world over-regulation by bureaucrats is a serious problem. In addition to producing corruption and distortion, our results strongly suggest that over-regulation drives business underground and thus undermines government revenue and the sensible provision of productivity-enhancing public goods.
In principle, higher tax rates could be an important reason for firms to move into the unofficial economy. In our sample, however, it appears that higher tax rates are associated with more tax revenue, a stronger legal environment, and less unofficial activity. We would caution, however, that a great deal depends on how the tax system is administered. Russia is a leading example of a country that has moderate statutory tax rates but a corrupt system of tax administration. The way the Russian tax system is run means that there is a heavy burden on firms and many of them choose to go underground. 1989 -90 (from Lacko (1996 , as reported in Schneider and Enste (1998)), rather than currency demand estimates.
Consistency of Estimates
Multiple estimates based on currency demand are available for most developed countries.
As Table 1 shows, these agree quite closely for most countries.
Electricity-based estimates, using the Lacko (1996), method are also available for most developed countries. In most cases these numbers are similar to the currency demand-based However, as Schneider and Enste (1998) discuss in detail, these estimates fit well with the available single country and anecdotal evidence.
estimates are also low relative to what happened later, but they provide a reasonable lower bound.
Appendix 2: Alternative Measures of Independent Variables
In order to make it easier to check our results, we have kept the original signs on variables. The reader should be careful because organizations' ratings differ in whether a high numerical value corresponds to "better" policies for business and private investment (i.e., less over-regulation or lower taxation). To help understand the scaling for each variable, in addition to the regression results we report individual highest and lowest scores in our sample, as well as the numbers for particularly noteworthy individual cases.
More discussion of these regression results was in our unpublished working paper and is available from the authors. Lacko (1996) as reported in Schneider and Enste (1998), Table 3 .1, part 1, first column and Table 3 .1 , part 3, last column.
MIMIC 1990-93 is from Loayza (1996) , also reported in Schneider and Enste (1998), Table 3 .1, part 1, second column.
Currency Demand 1990-93 is as used in Johnson, Kaufmann, and Loido-Zobaton (1998) ; sources are discussed in the text of this paper.
Currency Demand 1989-90 is from Schneider and Enste (1998), Table 3 .1, second column Alternative Currency Demand numbers are from Schneider and Enste (1998), Table 3 .1, part 3, columns 2 and 3, and Table 3 .2, part 2, columns 2 and 3.
Tanzania Currency Demand estimate is from Schneider and Enste (1998), Table 3 .1, part 1.
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